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A B S T R AC T . Just over ﬁfty years ago, Prime Minister Macmillan made an extensive tour of Africa,
culminating in his ‘wind of change’ speech in Cape Town, . This article traces Macmillan’s
progress through Africa with particular emphasis on his intervention in South African politics.
It offers a novel reading of the ‘wind of change’ speech, arguing that the message was far more
conciliatory with respect to white South African interests than is usually assumed. Pragmatism rather
than principle was always the prime consideration. Far from being cowed by Macmillan’s oratory or
his message, Verwoerd stood up to Macmillan and, at least in the eyes of his supporters, gave as good
as he got. The shock of the ‘wind of change’ speech was more evident in Britain and in British settler
regions of Africa than in South Africa. Macmillan’s advisers had an inﬂated view of the import of
the speech and in many ways misread Verwoerd’s brand of Afrikaner nationalism. One of the
consequences of the speech was to embolden Verwoerd politically, and to prepare him for the
declaration of republican status in  and departure from the commonwealth.
Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ address has gone down in history as one
of the great visionary speeches in post-war history, and perhaps the ﬁnest of
Macmillan’s career. As well as signalling a major policy change in respect of
African decolonization, it declared that South Africa was now so far out of step
with the trajectory of world events that Britain could no longer be counted upon
to lend support to apartheid in the international arena. Macmillan’s speech
demonstrated a sweeping grasp of historical circumstance. It was timely in its
assessment of contemporary realities. Its staging was dramatic, and its formal
construction and delivery magniﬁcent. Yet the power of the address was vitiated
* This paper was written for a conference organized by Sarah Stockwell and Larry Butler on
the ﬁftieth anniversary of the ‘wind of change’ address, held at the University of East Anglia,
March . Papers presented by Simon Ball, Stephen Howe, Joanna Lewis, Roger Louis, and
Stuart Ward were especially illuminating for my purposes. I have since had very helpful
comments from Hermann Giliomee, Alex Mouton, Rob Skinner, Andrew Thompson, Richard
Whiting, and the anonymous reviewers for the Historical Journal.
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by the broad realization that Britain was a declining force in Africa. The speech
amounted to concession dressed up as an act of statesmanship, an attempt to
regain some sense of domestic control and direction in respect of external
events that were no longer subject to Britain’s mastery.
The signiﬁcance of Macmillan’s speech had more to do with its recognition
of already existing forces than its originality or its grasp of the future. Indeed,
the central message about the force of African nationalism was already a truism
when Macmillan delivered it – and an understatement at that. Neither the
‘wind of change’ metaphor, nor the sentiments it described, were novel. Stanley
Baldwin had used a similar phrase to describe the growing forces of nationalism
round the world in . In , Macmillan had himself observed that the
growing nationalisms of Asia and Africa, which had been ‘but a ripple’, was now
‘almost a tidal wave’ that had to be guided into ‘broad and safe channels’ lest it
turned into communism. His message in  was an elaboration of this idea
in the speciﬁcally African context.
In South African historiography, the ‘wind of change’ speech is seldom
discussed, though routinely noted in passing. One reason is that Macmillan’s
visit is compacted into a dramatic series of events. The year  began
with Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd’s surprise announcement that a
referendum would be held later in the year to decide whether South Africa
should become a republic.Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ speech on  February
was soon occluded by the Sharpeville massacre and Langa uprisings in March;
by the UN Security Council condemnation of apartheid which followed; the
attempted assassination of Verwoerd on  April; the state of emergency and
banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC); the strongly contested republican referendum in October; and,
in December, the controversial World Council of Churches Conference at
Cottesloe. South Africa’s pressured withdrawal from the commonwealth in
May  was the culminating episode in eighteen months of feverish social
tumult, of which Macmillan’s address was merely one event.
The success of the speech has to be judged against its objectives. To the
extent that it laid a more or less clear exit strategy for Britain as an African
colonial power – part of Macmillan’s larger attempt to reconﬁgure British
attachments to the United States, on the one hand, and Europe, on the
other – it largely achieved its purpose. But if part of Macmillan’s intent was to
persuade white South Africans to see reason and to abandon the logic of
 A. Sampson, Mandela: the authorised biography (London, ), p. .
 Stanley Baldwin, in , spoke of ‘a wind of nationalism and freedom blowing round the
world’ and Nehru, in , referred to ‘strong winds’ ‘blowing all over Asia’. Saﬁre’s political
dictionary (Oxford, ), p. .  Cape Times,  Oct. .
 Hendrik Verwoerd, academic, newspaper editor, and politician (–), became prime
minister of South Africa in , having previously served as minister of native affairs. He
elevated apartheid into a full-ﬂedged philosophy in  as he laid out a strategy for giving
‘self-government’ to newly created ethnic ‘homelands’.
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Verwoerdian apartheid dogma, it must be judged a failure. The argument put
by Macmillan’s most recent biographer, D. R. Thorpe, that the ‘wind of change’
speech marked a ‘key moment in the struggle for black nationalism in South
Africa’, and that it was a harbinger of the eventual ending of apartheid,
oversimpliﬁes and exaggerates. It perpetuates a myth that can be traced back to
the contemporaneous boast by British High Commissioner John Maud that
Macmillan’s visit was ‘probably the most important event in South Africa since
the Nationalist Government came to power in ’ and that it would likely
disadvantage the South African government and bolster the opposition.
The unintended effect of the speech was to help empower Verwoerd by
reinforcing his dominance over domestic politics and by assisting him make two
hitherto separate strands of his political career seem mutually reinforcing:
republican nationalism on the one hand and apartheid ideology on the other.
The speech also helped to precipitate the crisis over South Africa’s membership
of the commonwealth – which was avowedly not Macmillan’s intention. Yet, the
consequence for the commonwealth was inadvertently beneﬁcial for it allowed
the ‘new’ multi-racial commonwealth to be born in the context of a great moral
cause. (The paradox here is that since South Africa’s re-entry, the common-
wealth has never seemed more lacking in direction.)
I
Macmillan’s decision to visit sub-Saharan Africa, the ﬁrst time for a serving
British prime minister, was arrived at towards the end of . It was a good
time to go. Following his convincing general electoral victory in October,
Macmillan was at last in full control of his cabinet and party. Albeit bruised by
his close involvement in Suez, Macmillan had managed to extricate himself
from direct responsibility for that debacle. Having endured and now adopted
the persona of ‘Supermac’, he considered that he now had a free hand to
exercise decisive leadership elsewhere. Following the success of his  visit to
commonwealth countries in Asia and Australasia, which greatly improved his
standing at home and abroad, Africa offered an opportunity for Macmillan to
secure his position as an international statesman and even to launch him as a
‘prophet of the multi-racial Commonwealth’.
Adoption of a coherent African policy was judged vital in a context where
colonial inﬂuence was dissipating and where the ensuing power vacuum invited
African nationalists to seek the support of communists. The fact that Macmillan
had shown only sporadic interest in the continent up till then proved an
advantage for he was relatively unburdened by past association. Africa was rising
 D. R. Thorpe, Supermac: the life of Harold Macmillan (London, ), pp. , –; The
National Archives (TNA), CAB /, dispatch by John Maud,  Feb. , in ‘Prime
minister’s African tour January–February’, p. .
 A. Sampson, Macmillan: a study in ambiguity (London, ), p. .
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conspicuously up the domestic British agenda, the future of Central Africa in
particular. The Labour party was making independence a campaigning issue,
in part because it offered alternative possibilities for the renewal of British
moral and political inﬂuence in the world. The Conservative party was divided
between those, like the ‘Bow Group’, who welcomed or accepted the
emergence of independent African nations, and a band of die-hard imperialist
traditionalists, the ‘Rhodesia lobby’, who were determined to stand by kith and
kin within the settler colonies. At issue was the future of the ‘greater Britain’
idea which had been a deﬁning aspect of British identity for nearly a century.
Enoch Powell’s reminder in July  of the need to accept moral and political
responsibility in respect of African colonial governance was a powerful
challenge to Macmillan. Operating from rather different assumptions, Kwame
Nkrumah likewise urged the desirability of a consistent statement of British
intentions.
In Iain Macleod, Macmillan had just selected an able and ambitious reform-
minded young colonial secretary of state who was keen to force the pace of
change. Macleod’s views were reinforced by ministrations from the mercurial
David Stirling, war hero and founder of the SAS, now leader of the central
African-based Capricorn Africa Society, who urged the necessity of endorsing
non-racial common citizenship in Africa as a whole.Macleod was keenly aware
of the deteriorating political situation in British colonial Africa. The Nyasaland
(Malawi) emergency, and the intractable problem of how to hold the Central
African Federation together, was a major concern. In Kenya, the Mau Mau
conﬂict and the revelations of the Hola camp killings exposed British duplicity
and continuing complicity with settler racism. In Ghana, independence had
already been achieved, while in Nigeria it was about to be attained. Seen
in this context – and leaving aside other colonial conﬂagrations beyond
British responsibility, like Algeria, and the developing crisis in the Belgian
Congo –Macmillan underestimated the pace of change. To refer to the ‘wind of
change’ in the singular rather than the plural was to oversimplify the many
different varieties of nationalism already in full display.
On  November , Macmillan wrote to his powerful and personally loyal
cabinet secretary, Norman Brook. He identiﬁed a need ‘to lift Africa onto a
more national plane as a problem to the solution of which we must all
 Ibid., p. ; D. Goldsworthy, ‘Conservatives and decolonization: a note on the
interpretation by Dan Horowitz’, African Affairs,  (), pp. –, at p. ; S. J. Ball,
‘Banquo’s ghost: Lord Salisbury, Harold Macmillan, and the high politics of decolonization,
–’, Twentieth-Century British History,  (), pp. –.
 R. Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the wind of change in Africa, –’, Historical Journal,
 (), pp. –, at pp. , ; Goldsworthy, ‘Conservatives and decolonization’,
p. .  A. Horne, Macmillan, II: – (Basingstoke, ), pp. –.
 Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the wind of change in Africa’, p. . See also B. Phiri,
‘The Capricorn Africa Society revisited: the impact of liberalism in Zambia’s colonial history,
–’, International Journal of African Historical Studies,  (), pp. –.
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contribute . . . by some really imaginative effort’. Macmillan had in mind an
extended visit analogous to his  trip to Asia.His initial idea was to arrange
his visit according to the length of time that particular states had been members
of the commonwealth, starting with South Africa, proceeding directly to Ghana,
and somehow working in near and potential commonwealth members like
Nigeria, Kenya, and the Central African Federation. This unworkable plan was
soon revised, partly for practical reasons, but also because Verwoerd favoured
the end of January on the grounds that this suited the parliamentary calendar
(and, conceivably, because the visit ﬁtted in with his as yet unannounced plan,
to announce a referendum on turning South Africa into a republic). South
Africa was now to become the ﬁnal destination of a journey that began in Ghana
and Nigeria, proceeded to the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, and ended up in
South Africa by way of the Protectorates.
The idea of an African ‘tour’, with its nostalgic associations of a ceremonial
royal progress, is revealing of the late colonial assumptions that infused the
pageant. But this was not a leisurely aristocratic excursion undertaken by an
Edwardian gentleman and his wife. It was a forward-looking performance of
political theatre designed to seize the political initiative and to mask growing
colonial enfeeblement with strength of resolve. The plot-line was broadly the
following: in , proclaimed ‘Africa Year’ by the Labour party as part of an
effort to rebuild the organization following its electoral defeat, a modern Tory
leader troops the colours of multi-racialism and demonstrates how Britain can
exit Africa stage right as an old-style colonial power; he then re-enters stage
left as ﬁrst amongst equals in the new commonwealth of nations. Securing
post-colonial goodwill through a reformed commonwealth constituted part of
Macmillan’s nascent ‘Grand Design’ whereby the ‘free world’ could combine
(with Britain acting as the key intermediary between the United States, and
Europe) to withstand the threat of global communism.
Accounts of the tour, including photographic records, show a mostly relaxed
Macmillan meeting political and civic dignitaries, visiting development projects
such as the Volta River dam site and the Tema harbour in Ghana, while
personally greeting African politicians variously attired in suits and traditional
dress. The welcoming crowds were rather smaller than anticipated. In time-
honoured proconsular manner, Macmillan professed delight at West Africa’s
‘colourful scene’ and the glorious welcomes extended by Accra market’s
 C. Baker, ‘Macmillan’s “wind of change” tour, ’, South African Historical Journal,
 (), pp. –, at p. ; R. Hyam, Britain’s declining empire: the road to decolonisation,
– (Cambridge, ), p. .
 Baker, ’Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” tour’, p. .
 C. Gurney, ‘“A great cause”: the origins of the anti-apartheid movement, June –
March ’, Journal of Southern African Studies,  (), pp. –, at p. .
 Thorpe, Supermac, pp. –; J. G. Giauque, Grand designs and visions of unity: the Atlantic
powers and the reorganization of Western Europe, – (Charlotte, NC, ), p. .
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‘famous “mammies”’. Lady Dorothy meanwhile busied herself with visits to
schools and clinics. Macmillan was charmed by a genial Kwame Nkrumah,
notwithstanding the Ghanaian leader’s public denunciation of colonialism as
an ‘anachronism’ which should ‘cease’. At a state banquet in Accra, Macmillan
acknowledged the ‘strong tide of feeling among Africans that this is a time of
destiny’. He also spoke of ‘the wind of change [blowing] right through Africa’.
Yet, the phrase was not picked up by journalists, perhaps because it seemed to
be little more than ‘a statement of the obvious’.
At the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, Macmillan was surprised – without being
unduly discomﬁted – when students displayed placards such as ‘Macbutcher Go
Home’. In Blantyre, where the government state of emergency was in full force,
Macmillan encountered demonstrations against Federation. Protestors bore
placards demanding the release from detention of Dr Banda, whose continued
imprisonment was a major point of contention. In Livingstone, Macmillan
also encountered crowd anger; he was undeterred when a crude gelignite bomb
was found in the Savoy Hotel, Ndola, shortly before he was due to address an
audience. The political tensions of Central Africa were expressed even more
volubly in Salisbury. Here, Macmillan was forced to deny a statement he had
made in Lagos that was taken as casting doubt on the future of Federation.
Lengthy meetings with forceful characters like Roy Welensky, prime minister of
the Federation, did not make Macmillan’s visit any easier.
That Macmillan should ﬁnd himself involved in difﬁcult bouts of mediation
in Central Africa was unavoidable given that the future of the Federation was
now Britain’s most pressing and intractable African problem. In South Africa,
by contrast, Macmillan was the guest of a sovereign state, a fact that his hosts
made emphatically clear. As Norman Brook’s record of Macmillan’s report to
cabinet makes clear, Britain bore responsibility for the central African region,
though it possessed ‘no power – only inﬂuence’. In South Africa, by contrast,
Britain’s task was to ‘concentrate on our agreements’, ‘to keep them with us’,
and to hold the commonwealth together. The language of friendship,
hospitality, and mutuality was one that the British and the South Africans
both employed in recognition of the fact that the awkward discussions between
Macmillan and Verwoerd were being conducted between the leaders of
independent states.
 H. Macmillan, Pointing the way, – (London, ), p. .
 D. Hunt, On the spot: an ambassador remembers (London, ), p. ; TNA, CAB
/, ‘Prime minister’s African tour’, p. .
 Macmillan, Pointing the way, p. ; Illustrated London News,  Feb. ; Sampson,
Macmillan, pp. –; Horne, Macmillan, p. ; Guardian,  Jan. .
 Guardian,  Jan. .
 Illustrated London News,  Feb.  and  Feb. ; Die Transvaler,  Jan. .
 TNA, CAB /, cabinet secretary notebooks, extract from cabinet meeting,  Feb.
. My thanks to Tessa Stirling for extracts from cabinet minutes and other material in TNA.
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Macmillan chose Cape Town as the place to claim the moral high ground by
renouncing racial rule and distancing the British government from apartheid.
South African whites were ostensibly the primary audience, yet the speech was
geared to a much wider set of constituencies. It was intended to signal a major
policy shift on Africa to Macmillan’s political constituency at home and to
an international audience (the United States especially) that was increasingly
impatient with Britain’s continuing involvement as a colonial power. Equally
importantly, the message was directed to whites in central and eastern Africa,
and also to newly independent Africa where apartheid was increasingly
regarded as a symbol of colonial subjection. Macmillan’s initiative was a bold
and clever attempt to address multiple audiences and the speech was written
and delivered with consummate skill. Whether it worked out as intended – or as
claimed – is another matter.
There were few intimations at the start of Macmillan’s South African visit that
he would raise controversy. Arriving in Johannesburg on  January , he
was met by the debonair British high commissioner, Sir John Maud, and
accompanied throughout his visit by South Africa’s dour minister of external/
foreign affairs and representative to the United Nations, Eric Louw, whose
presence was a constant source of tension. An aggressive nationalist who had
exhibited strong fascist sympathies during the war and excelled in rabble-
rousing anti-Semitism, Louw was happy to act as Prime Minister Hendrik
Verwoerd’s ‘chief hatchet man’. Louw was a pugnacious defender of South
Africa’s interests and, unusually for a senior diplomat, did not seem to think
that charm was a necessary part of the profession’s weaponry.
Macmillan’s visit was carefully managed by his hosts. Ever keen to portray the
apartheid dystopia to best effect, the South African prime minister arranged for
his guests to visit the new model African township of Meadowlands where he was
entertained in the police station. It was to this (misleadingly named) ‘Bantu
location’ that many victims of the Sophiatown urban clearances had recently
been removed. A group of protesters paraded banners: ‘Please visit our leaders’;
‘Apartheid is dead, not even Mac can save it’. At the new homeland university of
Turﬂoop in the northern Transvaal, an uncomfortable-looking Macmillan had
a leopard skin kaross pinned to his suit while being invested with the authority
of a Bantu chief. The Sekukuni paramount chief (more likely a junior
functionary pretending to be the paramount) addressed him: ‘Now you see
for yourself – we do not live in chains!’ The discordant artiﬁciality of this staged
exercise in Verwoerdian tribalism was heightened by a performance of Purcell’s
 F. Myers, ‘Harold Macmillan’s “winds of change” speech: a case study in the rhetoric of
policy change’, Rhetoric and Public Affairs,  (), pp. –, at pp. –.
 Sampson, Macmillan, p. .
 Ibid., p. ; D. Eisenberg, ‘The Commonwealth Conference’, Africa South,  (),
p. .
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‘Nymphs and sheperds’ put on by a Sotho girl choir. Macmillan also visited
the sacralized Voortrekker Monument and he was taken down a mineshaft at
West Driefontein. In his autobiography, Macmillan records that he was able to
meet ‘many representatives of different points of view’ on the Rand, but this
does not appear to have extended beyond English-speaking opinion formers
like the industrialist Harry Oppenheimer and the editor of the evening
Johannesburg newspaper, The Star. Macmillan complained of excessive security
arrangements.
Macmillan arrived in Cape Town on  February. He was met at the airport by
Verwoerd and applauded by a crowd of ,, some of whom waved Union
Jacks. A small group of welcoming Africans were stationed in the airport’s
‘non-European’ enclosure. Cordial words were exchanged on the tarmac
between the two leaders: Macmillan spoke about the commonwealth connec-
tion while Verwoerd welcomed his counterpart as the prime minister of a
‘friendly nation’ and as someone who might become a personal friend.
Macmillan stayed with Verwoerd at the prime minister’s ofﬁcial residence at
Groote Schuur, an estate set in large grounds below Table Mountain, which had
been designed by Herbert Baker in vernacular Cape Dutch style for Cecil
Rhodes. Whereas Rhodes’s predelictions led him to employ an all-male staff,
Verwoerd made a point of having no blacks in the house: the Macmillans were
duly assigned an ‘old and incompetent Dutch butler’. Macmillan found the
house ‘strangely grim’.
At Groote Schuur, Macmillan had extended private discussions with
Verwoerd, along with Eric Louw, Norman Brook, and the ex-Oxford politics
don, now British high commissioner, John Maud. Macmillan reported that
Verwoerd spoke in a quiet voice, suggesting reasonableness, but that he was
entirely unyielding. To Macmillan, the high-church Anglican, Verwoerd was
unpleasantly reminiscent of the Scottish Presbyterian, John Knox. The South
African prime minister’s overbearing self-conﬁdence, coupled with his slight
insecurity as a Hollander-turned-Afrikaner, frequently manifested itself in an
insistent willingness to explain his policies at great length and with the pedantry
of an academic who was accustomed to being listened to. Perhaps he was
applying the lessons of his  doctoral thesis in experimental psychology
titled the ‘Blunting of the emotions’. Its key point was that emotional responses
could be manipulated by means of incessant repetition of particular stimuli –
which in the case of Verwoerd’s academic experiments entailed subjecting
individuals to various colour combinations, and punishing or rewarding them
appropriately.
 Hunt, On the spot, p. ; Guardian,  Jan. ; TNA, CAB /, ‘Prime minister’s
African tour’, p. .  Macmillan, Pointing the way, pp. –.
 Cape Times,  Feb. .  Macmillan, Pointing the way, p. .
 H. F. Verwoerd, ‘A method for the experimental production of emotions’, American
Journal of Psychology,  (), pp. –.
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At a garden party hosted on  February by John Maud, Macmillan was able to
speak to white liberal opponents of apartheid like the Anglican archbishop,
Joost de Blank, Patrick Duncan, and Margaret Ballinger. The Illustrated
London News printed a picture of the occasion revealing a tense high table with
an empty seat for Macmillan – who had meanwhile slipped away to confer with
Ballinger on an outdoor sofa. The Daily Telegraph commented that ‘that this
strikingly ostentatious display of interest in Liberal opinion was designed as a
consolation prize for the failure to see representatives of African opinion’.
The Guardian quoted sources suggesting that Macmillan was virtually a prisoner
of Verwoerd’s and that he was ‘irritated’ at not being given the opportunity to
consult with genuine African leaders. David Hunt, who accompanied
Macmillan throughout his Africa tour, made a similar point, emphasizing
Louw’s opposition to Macmillan meeting African nationalists. In seeking a
meeting with the prime minister, the ANC expressed anxiety that the South
African government would use the occasion to ‘quell the mounting worldwide
condemnation of their racialistic and oppressive policies’. The non-racial
Liberal party likewise sought an interview with Macmillan. Hunt recorded that
the prime minister was himself willing to see ‘these people’ if the government
did not object. Macmillan had indeed met a range of African nationalists
elsewhere on the continent but there is no compelling evidence to suggest that
he or the British high commission had tried hard to effect similar meetings in
South Africa; the ofﬁcial record displays a measure of defensiveness on this
count, not least because it was anticipated that the issue would be taken
up by the press and in the British parliament. Macmillan’s attempts to get
Verwoerd to take public responsibility for preventing him seeing the ANC and
the Liberal party were rebuffed by Louw. The (tacitly) agreed formula was that
Macmillan would meet only with the parliamentary opposition and it was on
these grounds that the British prime minister declined to meet a deputation
from the ANC.
Fear of offending their hosts was the major reason, but consular insularity was
perhaps just as signiﬁcant. Patrick Duncan reportedly found the prime minister
‘suddenly deaf ’ when he urged Macmillan to seek out black leaders at Maud’s
whites-only garden party. Anthony Sampson added, pertinently, that the high
 Cape Times,  Feb. .
 Cited in Cape Times,  Feb. ; also Sampson, Macmillan, p. .
 Guardian,  Feb. .
 Hunt, On the spot, p. ; ‘Letter from DWS Hunt (CRO) to Sir A. Clutterbuck giving his
personal impressions’ of Macmillan’s Cape Town speech,  Feb. , doc. , in R. Hyam
and W. R. Louis, eds., The Conservative government and the end of empire, –, Part II Series
A Vol.  (London, ), p. ; TNA, PREM /, D. Nokwe (ANC secretary-general) to
Macmillan,  Jan. , and Peter Brown (chair Liberal party) to Macmillan,  Jan. .
 TNA, CAB /, ‘Prime minister’s Africa tour’, pp. , –; TNA, PREM
/, J. B. Johnston to high commissioner,  Jan. , Macmillan to D. Nokwe,  Feb.
; Maud to Bligh,  Jan. .
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commission knew little about the African leadership. Notwithstanding the
heavily publicized treason trial of anti-apartheid activists and the Deﬁance
Campaign which preceded it, all indications are that British diplomats had little
appreciation of the importance or depth of extra-parliamentary political
opposition, and little inclination to ﬁnd out. John Maud’s conﬁdential post-
speech report in which he remarked that ‘the slogan-bearing campaign
announced by the African National Congress’ proved ‘a ﬂop’, does not suggest
undue disappointment. In assessing the views of the ‘general public’, his
conﬁdential comments on South African reactions to the visit made no mention
of black opinion. Conscious of Macmillan’s vulnerability to criticism for not
having met with leading ﬁgures in the anti-apartheid opposition, Hunt loftily
suggested that the content of the speech might serve as consolation for the
ANC’s failure to make direct contact with the British prime minister. On the
ﬁnal day of Macmillan’s visit, a hastily arranged meeting (at the government’s
behest) took place with the newly formed Council for Coloured Affairs – a
compromised advisory body with a majority of government-nominated
representatives that was subject to a boycott by leading coloured political
organizations. Having already accepted not to meet the ANC or Liberals, it is
unclear why Macmillan acceded to the government’s late request.
I I I
The climax of the Africa tour was Macmillan’s speech to both Houses of the
South African parliament on  February. The speech had been carefully written
over two months and was polished and revised almost up to the point of its
delivery. Its origins were in a draft thematic outline put together by Macmillan’s
principal private secretary, Tim Bligh. John Maud travelled to London for
consultations in December and did much to ﬁll out the structure of the
speech. As the man-on-the-spot, Maud was considered by his own side to have
‘mastered the knack of speaking forcefully to Afrikaners without mortally
offending them’ – an assessment that seems not to have been shared by leading
Afrikaner nationalist politicians. Notes of discussions with Macmillan in mid-
December reveal Maud cautioning against making direct criticisms of apartheid
 Sampson, Mandela, p. .
 TNA, PREM /, ‘South Africa fortnightly summary, th January to th February,
’, conﬁdential savingram no.  from UK high commission, South Africa, to
Commonwealth Relations Ofﬁce,  Feb. , and telegram no. , ‘Reactions to prime
minister’s visit’ (conﬁdential)  Feb. ; ‘Letter from DWS Hunt Clutterbuck’, doc. , in
Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government, pp. –.
 Times, ‘Lord Redcliffe-Maud’ (obituary),  Feb. .
 Hyam, Britain’s declining empire, p. . The senior nationalist leader Paul Sauer regarded
Maud as a constant source of tension during his time as British high commissioner and found
him antagonistic towards Afrikaners. See Dirk en Johanna de Villiers, Paul Sauer (Cape Town,
), pp. –. Also W. A. Bellwood, South African backdrop (Cape Town, ), p. . I am
grateful to Alex Mouton and David Scher for these sources.
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(which is not to deny that he personally found it repugnant) in contrast to
Macmillan’s wish to include a clear note of censure. A South African
commentator put a different spin on his supreme diplomatic skills: with Maud
‘you have to take the smooth with the smooth’.
Either David Hunt, of the Commonwealth Relations Ofﬁce, or James
Robertson in the Colonial Ofﬁce, were responsible for introducing the ‘wind
of change’ phrase. There were contributions by several others too, including
John (Jack) Johnston, Maud’s deputy in South Africa, and Evelyn Baring,
Maud’s immediate predecessor as South African high commissioner and
thereafter governor of Kenya during the period of Mau Mau. Baring (who was
said by Alec Douglas-Home to know the South Africans ‘inside out’) provided
background points which bore on the history and psychology of Afrikaner
nationalism. Julian Amery and Foreign Secretary Home made suggestions.
Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook also made a substantial contribution to the
speech. Macmillan took an active interest throughout.
In striking respects – their Oxbridge education, patrician ways, and cautious
reform-minded outlook – the interlocking careers and shared outlook of high-
calibre ofﬁcials like Maud, and Baring, as well as the more junior Hunt and
Johnston, recalls those of the inﬂuential ‘Milner Kindergarten’ a generation
earlier. All except Brook (who nonetheless took a very close interest in
commonwealth affairs) had direct experience of South Africa and they shared
in common a disapproval of apartheid. Whereas Milner’s men had been
concerned to contain dominion nationalism within the commonwealth,
Macmillan’s paladins were striving to maintain a degree of British inﬂuence
over the newly emerging multi-racial commonwealth. In seeking to achieve this
objective they expended a considerable amount of cultural and political capital.
Ronald Hyam nicely characterizes the patrician administrators who super-
intended the decolonization of Africa as ‘rather like plants which put on their
ﬁnest display as a herald of death’.
Anthony Sampson, who attended the speech as the London Observer’s
correspondent, records that it was widely expected to be congratulatory since
the occasion coincided with the ﬁftieth anniversary of Union. The streets of
Cape Town were full of celebratory ﬂags. Macmillan addressed the joint houses
of parliament in the Old Assembly dining room, which served as the chamber of
the Cape parliament until . He was seated in front of a large oil painting
depicting Lord de Villiers, one of the architects of reconciliation between
 TNA, PREM /, ‘Note for the record’, by Tim Bligh,  Dec. .
 Sampson, Mandela, p. .
 Sampson, Macmillan, p. ; Baker, ‘Macmillan’s “wind of change” tour’, pp. –;
Hunt, On the spot, p. ; Oxford dictionary of national biography, entries on Brook, Hunt, Maud;
TNA, PREM /, Home to Macmillan,  Dec. .
 Hyam, Britain’s declining empire, p. .
 www.info.gov.za/events//sona_background.htm.
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Boers and British, making the case for Union to the Cape parliament.
The penumbra of Union, one of the great moments of British constitutional
achievement, remained visible around the dark shadow of Afrikaner national-
ism. Macmillan duly began with fulsome acknowledgment of the ﬁftieth
anniversary of Union. He paid tribute to the fruits of South African nationhood,
in particular its immense material and scientiﬁc progress. While recognizing
South Africa’s independence, he laid stress on its mutual interdependence with
Britain in trade, investment, and in times of war.
All this was a lengthy prelude to Macmillan’s pragmatic recognition of the
unstoppable forces of African nationalism that were making themselves felt in
Africa. Slyly, he reminded his hosts that they ‘understand this better than
anyone’:
You are sprung from Europe, the home of nationalism, and here in Africa you have
yourselves created a new nation. Indeed, in the history of our times yours will be
recorded as the ﬁrst of the African nationalisms, and this tide of national
consciousness which is now rising in Africa is a fact for which you and we and the
other nations of the Western World are ultimately responsible.
Addressing Afrikaners as well as English-speakers, Macmillan referred to the
signiﬁcant Scottish inﬂuence on the Dutch Reformed Church, thereby allowing
him, a fellow Scot, to speak to South Africans as a friend and a relation.
Macmillan was softening up his hosts through ﬂattery, yet by recalling the
long period of co-operation and friendship between Britain and South Africa
since Union, he was clearly gesturing towards the still vocal pro-imperial and
pro-settler constituency within the Tory party at home, whose loyalties were to
the ﬁrst British commonwealth rather than the multi-racial version that was just
now emerging. For men like Macmillan’s son-in-law, Julian Amery, as well as
Macmillan’s bitter rival, Lord Salisbury, support for settlers in Rhodesia and the
retention of historic imperial ties in South Africa was a matter of faith. One did
not renounce white civilization for reasons of expedience even if the ‘irresistible
impulse of  [had] become the impossibilist lost cause of ’.
The passage in which Macmillan recognized the ‘wind of change blowing
through this continent’ as a ‘political fact’ highlighted the pragmatism that
marked him out from empire loyalists like Amery and, indeed, Churchill (who
subsequently expressed his disapproval of the speech in private conversation
with Brook, saying of the Afrikaners: ‘Why go and pick a quarrel with those
 Illustrated London News,  Feb. .
 Macmillan’s use of his own family ancestry had another purpose: while counting himself
as a Scot, he noted that his mother was American, and he likened the puritan inﬂuence on the
United States to South Africa. He was evidently sending out a message, to an American
audience, that he was personally keen to cultivate the ‘special relationship’.
 Edward Pearce, ‘Last echo of empire’ obituary, Julian Amery, Guardian,  Sept. ; Ball,
‘Banquo’s ghost’.
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chaps’?). In Macmillan’s view, political realism rather than moral conviction
determined that African nationalism had to be recognized. ‘We must all accept
it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.’ This use of the
collective personal pronoun is worth consideration. ‘Our’ national policies
clearly referred to Britain’s strategic interests. But was Macmillan including
South Africans in this more capacious sense of ‘we’; did his repeated use of ‘you’
refer mostly to Afrikaners? When Macmillan divided the world into three
different groups, he was certainly including South Africa with Britain: ‘You in
South Africa and we in Britain’ belong to the Western powers and the ‘Free
World’ (surely an odd formulation given that he was referring to the apartheid
state). South Africa was manifestly not part of his second main group, namely
communists. Nor were they part of the third group, ‘those parts of the world
whose people are at present uncommitted either to Communism or to our
Western ideas’, namely the non-aligned countries of Asia and Africa.
By including South Africa in the ﬁrst and not in the third group, Macmillan
revealed as clearly as he could that he was talking to white South Africa,
a key anti-communist ally. He expressed unambiguous disapproval of racism,
citing Selwyn Lloyd’s recent rejection at the United Nations of ‘the inherent
superiority of one race over another’. Yet, Macmillan’s disapproval of
apartheid had more to do with the difﬁculties this posed for Britain’s position
in the rest of Africa, the Central African Federation in particular, than its effects
on black South Africans. As Brook noted when defending the speech to
Churchill, ‘it was wise to make our position clear, because of our responsibilities
elsewhere in Africa’. Strikingly, Macmillan’s recognition of nationalism in
Africa did not extend to African nationalism in South Africa, other than by
implication. He certainly made no reference to African nationalist movements
such as the ANC or the newly formed PAC, nor did he seem to conceive of their
struggle as one for freedom. With Britain’s interests always foremost in his mind,
Macmillan was trying to save white South Africa from itself.
Even when Macmillan delicately referred to ‘the peculiar nature of the
problems with which you are faced here in the Union of South Africa’ – the
word ‘apartheid’ was not directly mentioned in the speech –Macmillan
acknowledged the differences between ‘your situation and that of most of the
other states in Africa’. This softened the key message that ‘there are some
aspects of your policies which make it impossible’ for us in Britain to support
South Africa as a fellow member of the commonwealth ‘without being false to
our own deep convictions about the political destinies of free men’. Macmillan
took enormous care not to offend white South African sensibilities by offering
 TNA, PREM /, Brook to Macmillan,  Mar. . Lady Churchill disagreed with
Winston but thought it ‘impolitic’ to support Brook because ‘Winston always thinks of me as a
crypto-Socialist.’
 This did not prevent Selwyn Lloyd calling his black Labrador ‘Sambo’. See Thorpe,
Supermac, p. .  TNA, PREM /, Brook to Macmillan,  Mar. .
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no direct support to black South Africans. He hinted at the potential fragility
of white supremacy with plangent references to politicians and statesmen as
‘ﬂeeting transient phantoms on the great stage of history’ – remarks which
suggested parallels with the dissolving British empire. Such airy philosophical
musing would have been lost on Verwoerd who once declared that he was never
troubled by any doubts that he might be wrong. Far more reassuring to
Verwoerd was Macmillan’s clear renunciation of economic sanctions: ‘Boycotts
will never get you anywhere, and may I say in parenthesis that I deprecate the
attempts that are being made today in Britain to organize the consumer boycott
of South African goods.’ This was one of the few passages in Macmillan’s speech
to be applauded.
There is thus nothing to suggest that Macmillan was concerned to align
himself with those who opposed white ascendancy, a cause that the Labour
party and the churches were increasingly taking up. In recognizing the force of
African nationalism as a historical ‘fact’, he did not either endorse or welcome
its emergence. Macmillan’s opposition to race-based discrimination was
prompted by the new context of post-war anti-colonialism which entailed guilt
by association for any country offering support for white South Africa. The
moral principles were, for him, less of an issue. Even at the time of his African
tour, Macmillan was not above referring in private to Africans as childish
barbarians. His view of white settlers in Africa was also tainted with racial
condescension and snobbery. Simon Ball’s comment that Macmillan evinced
a lack of sympathy and understanding for rulers as well as ruled is amply borne
out in his Africa tour.
There is plenty of evidence that Macmillan found extreme Afrikaner
nationalism thoroughly distasteful and Verwoerd, in particular, trying.
In Brook’s words, the Afrikaners were ‘very different from the Boers’ who
Churchill ‘knew and liked’. Macmillan accepted the prevailing, often
complacent and self-serving, anglophone stereotype, which portrayed
Afrikaner nationalism as something of an aberration, the ‘obscurantist’ product
of an odious form of old testament Calvinism, a modern hangover of old
frontier mentalities. Yet, he seems to have been vexed more by apartheid
fanaticism than he was by the prospect of continuing white rule. Harold Evans,
press secretary, recorded a private comment made by Macmillan while in
Pretoria regarding the folly of elevating segregation into a doctrine: ‘If they
didn’t make an ideology of it they would almost certainly succeed in getting the
results they seek with a minimum of concession. Economic differences would
alone be sufﬁcient to achieve practical separation.’ Macmillan’s realism is
 Ball, ‘Banquo’s ghost’, pp. , .
 S. J. Ball, ‘Macmillan, the second world war and the empire’, in R. Aldous and S. Lee, eds.,
Harold Macmillan: aspects of a political life (Basingstoke, ), p. .
 TNA, PREM /, Brook to Macmillan,  Mar. .
 H. Evans, Downing Street diary: the Macmillan years, – (London, ), p. .
Macmillan added: ‘Of course, they would have to accept the really talented African’,
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pithily expressed in his report to cabinet on  February, as recorded by
Norman Brook:
Having said what had to be said on racial ques, we must now concentrate on our
agreements and hold this in Commonwealth. They have played the game with us, in
many troubles – we shld. Recognize that. And a ﬂourishing country with gt. Future
(?). Must keep them with us. Much thinking among younger people. Pity Afrikaners
don’t travel more abroad.
I V
Macmillan’s speech was endured for the most part in silence, yet the story that
he received almost no applause at the conclusion of his speech is not borne out
by the radio broadcast. Immediately after Macmillan concluded, Verwoerd
stood up to reply. Several accounts claim that the South African prime minister
was visibly shocked. This is not entirely surprising: although Macmillan had
discussed the broad outlines of his speech with Verwoerd, he chose not to
supply him with an advance copy, a decision that was seen by Verwoerd’s
advisers as a serious breach of protocol. The Cape Times’s parliamentary
columnist reported that Verwoerd was so angered that ‘he began to stumble
through his impromptu opening sentences, groping for some sort of sketchy
control over his churning thoughts. Never once did he establish anything like
his old ﬂuency’. But a letter from a radio listener, who claimed to be
vehemently opposed to apartheid, took strong exception to this interpretation,
detecting no sign of stumbling in Verwoerd’s opening sentences within the
broadcast and acknowledging that the South African prime minister had
acquitted himself well. The Afrikaans newspaper, Die Burger, reported that
congratulatory telegrams began to ﬂood in to Verwoerd’s ofﬁce as soon as the
speeches were over.
Afrikaner nationalists, who still smarted from the slights and condescension
of British imperiousness, greatly admired Verwoerd’s ability to stand up to
Macmillan. This was certainly the view of Paul Sauer, a long-time rival of the
prime minister, who praised Verwoerd’s response as an intellectual tour de
force. Verwoerd may not have known that Macmillan had vomited just before
delivering his speech, but he evidently took pleasure in telling the seasoned
leaving Evans to wonder how the demand for political rights by the ‘talented African’ would
be met.
 TNA, CAB /, extract from cabinet secretary notebooks from cabinet meeting on
 Feb. .
 Verwoerd’s ultra-loyal private secretary, Fred Barnard, was enraged by Macmillan’s
failure to supply his boss with an advance copy and regarded the speech as an insult. ‘The
speech occupied nearly ten pages; ten pages of silken, smooth-tongued, cold and calculated
insults of courteously phrased, remorseless condemnation of the country whose guest he was.’
F. Barnard, Thirteen years with Verwoerd (Johannesburg, ), pp. , .
 Cape Times,  Feb. .  Ibid., letter to the editor.
 Die Burger,  Feb. .  De Villiers, Paul Sauer, p. .
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diplomat, Brand Fourie, that the British prime minister was so nervous that he
had difﬁculty in turning the pages of his speech. For men in the South African
prime minister’s inner circle, Verwoerd’s calm and reasoned response to
Macmillan was what really counted.
Verwoerd’s message was simple and direct, though by no means ‘lame and
ungracious’ – as the British high commission reported. While accepting that
there were honest differences of opinion, he thanked the British prime minister
for his forthright remarks and drew attention to their respective countries’
shared ideals and interests. In language that was coolly instructional rather than
deﬁant, Verwoerd insisted that the ‘there must not only be justice to the Black
man in Africa, but also to the White man’: white South Africa was a bulwark
against communism; its mission in Africa was grounded in the values of
Christian civilization. Besides, there was no other place for whites to go because
although whites called themselves ‘European’ they were themselves African and
had established themselves in their motherland before the advent of the
‘Bantu’. He suggested that Britain’s policies might prove counter-productive to
its very objects.
Whether Verwoerd’s response was ‘his ﬁnest hour’ or the ‘most brilliant of his
career’, as some historians have claimed, depends on the bar we wish to set.
There are nevertheless good reasons to believe that his impromptu reply greatly
heartened his supporters and helped persuade conservative English-speakers to
endorse the republican cause. The Liberal party journal, Contact, acknowl-
edged that Verwoerd had shown ‘tremendous ability’ – adding that this ‘may be
an understatement’. Apartheid, it reasoned, was a doctrinally driven ‘diabolical
regime’ and Verwoerd fully understood that he could not afford to lose the
battle of ideas. He had succeeded in replying to the British prime minister’s
carefully engineered ‘atom bomb’, in a language not his own, with a speech that
showed ‘a sense of timing and of history’.
The English-speaking press was full of praise for Macmillan’s address.
There was consensus that it was fair-minded and frank, as well as courteous
and tactful. The Cape Times considered that ‘as an essay in statecraft’ it was
‘the work of a virtuoso’. ‘Adderley’, the parliamentary columnist who so
delighted in Verwoerd’s discomfort, gushed that there had probably never been
 Brand Fourie, ‘Buitelandse sake onder Dr Verwoerd’, in W. J. Verwoerd, ed., Verwoerd: Só
onthou ons hom (Pretoria, ), p. ; also C. Boshoff, ‘Mentor’, in ibid., p. .
 TNA, PREM /, ‘South Africa fortnightly summary, th January to th February,
’, conﬁdential savingram no.  from UK high commission, South Africa, to
Commonwealth Relations Ofﬁce,  Feb. , p. .
 D.M. Scher, ‘–’, in B. J. Liebenberg and S. B. Spies, eds., South Africa in the
twentieth century (Pretoria, ), pp. –; H. Kenney, Architect of apartheid: H. F .Verwoerd – an
appraisal (Johannesburg, ), p. ; De Villiers, Sauer, p. .
 Contact,  Feb. . The editor of Contact sent a telegram to Macmillan immediately
after the delivery of his speech, calling it ‘historic’ and congratulating him for speaking ‘for the
human race and for all the best in British and South African traditions and history’.
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‘so polished, so adroit a speech’ made in the Union parliament. For the Rand
Daily Mail it was ‘a stylish combination of candour and diplomacy’. A cartoon
in the liberal journal Contact by the usually perceptive David Marais showed
Verwoerd with an injured arm in a sling after shaking hands with Macmillan.
Yet, the Liberal party chairman, Peter Brown, wisely cautioned that those
English-speakers who delighted in Verwoerd’s discomﬁture ought to be
aware that it was white supremacy, not only ‘baaskap apartheid’ (crude racial
domination), that was under attack. In the face of overseas criticism, he
observed, the views of the ofﬁcial opposition were converging with the
government. This troubling reality was indeed the case and Verwoerd was
doing everything he could to encourage such convergence.
The reaction of African nationalists is more difﬁcult to judge. In
Johannesburg and Cape Town, small groups of ANC supporters, standing in
silence, held placards urging Macmillan to talk with Congress leaders, while in
Cape Town, ANC women managed to evade police attempts to disperse them
outside parliament and proceeded to unfurl banners with slogans, including
one which read: ‘Mac, Verwoerd is not our leader.’ Mandela is said to have
thought Macmillan’s speech ‘terriﬁc’ and he clearly had Macmillan’s sense of
historic sweep in mind when, in , he reciprocated with a speech to both
houses of the British parliament in Westminster Hall that speciﬁcally recalled
the ‘wind of change’ address. ANC leader Luthuli was pleasantly surprised,
noting that Macmillan had given the African people ‘some inspiration and
hope’. Scepticism was the prevailing sentiment in advance of the speech and
expectations on the part of the ANC were low. More interested in the British
government’s actions than its words, ANC Secretary-General Duma Nokwe was
especially concerned with Britain’s voting intentions at the United Nations. The
circular he co-signed with Alfred Nzo to instruct prospective ANC protesters
stated bluntly that the purpose of Macmillan’s visit ‘is part of a campaign to
whitewash the reputation of the Nationalists at a time when the world’s criticism
 Cape Times,  Feb. ; see also Star,  Feb. .
 Rand Daily Mail,  Feb. .  Contact,  Feb. , ‘Justus’.
 Peter Brown, ‘Apartheid isolated’, Contact,  Mar. . TNA, CAB /,
conﬁdential telegram no.  from Commonwealth Relations Ofﬁce to the Prime Minister’s
Ofﬁce,  Feb. , made the point that the United Party line was ‘to welcome speech warmly
as rebuff for nationalists while ignoring its implications for themselves’.
 Guardian,  Jan. ; Star,  Feb. . ANC leaders Duma Nokwe and Alfred Nzo
issued a circular instructing supporters to organize ten-strong groups of women protesters
bearing placards at events where Macmillan was likely to appear. Suggested slogans included
‘We have never had it so bad’ and ‘Meet our leaders too and hear our side.’ Circular signed by
Duma Nokwe and Alfred Nzo in TNA, PREM, /.
 Sampson,Mandela, p. ; At Westminster Hall on  July , Mandela said: ‘We are in
the Houses in which Harold Macmillan worked – he who spoke in our own Houses of
Parliament in Cape Town in , shortly before the infamous Sharpeville Massacre, and
warned a stubborn and race-blinded white oligarchy in our country that “the wind of change
is blowing through this continent”.’ www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela//
sp.html.
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has been sharpened against Apartheid’. Whether Nokwe and Nzo revised
their opinions after the speech is unclear.
What is clear, however, is that Macmillan’s advisers in South Africa were
concerned only with the impact of the speech on whites. John Maud wrote to
Macmillan immediately after the speech and, with a touch of self-serving
obsequiousness, declared it ‘a triumph: I have absolutely no doubt about that.’
Opposition parliamentarians, he reported, were so jubilant that they elected ‘to
conceal their full feelings & speak only out of the corner of their mouths’; three
cabinet ministers spoke with ‘full understanding of what you felt about
apartheid & without a ﬂicker of criticism of the speech or of you. Dr V’s effort,
after yours, was all that was needed to make the effect of your triumph certain.
The whole thing will have done untold good, out here.’
A British ofﬁcial who spoke to lobby journalists immediately after the speech,
reported to the British high commission that the National party rank and ﬁle
were ‘taken aback and a little resentful’ at Macmillan’s outspoken criticism,
adding that Nationalist parliamentarians had been instructed not to complain
in public and were therefore not commenting to the press. The opposition
United party was said to be ‘uneasy’ and uncertain what their response should
be. Only the small Progressive party was ‘jubilant’. An alternative reading of
these internal reports is that the National party, while somewhat shocked by
Macmillan’s criticisms, was not awed. It is questionable whether the nationalist
papers were ‘plunged into the deepest gloom’, as David Hunt, undersecretary
in the Commonwealth Relations Ofﬁce, claimed. The Johannesburg Star was
more accurate when it characterized the response of the Afrikaans press as
‘guarded’.
Wishful thinking on the part of Macmillan’s entourage and a small band
of liberal anglophile South Africans encouraged them to exaggerate the
sensational import and impact of the speech and its likely positive impact on
(white) anti-government opinion. Peregrine Worsthorne, a sceptical member of
the British press corps, thought the speech ‘something of an anti-climax’
because the underlying message was ‘so wrapped up with polite wafﬂe that few
in the audience got it’. He was especially scathing towards his British journalist
colleagues for their collective failure to engage with Afrikaner opinion-
makers – and also for wrongly assuming that Nationalist MPs were outraged by
the speech, when in fact they were expecting rather worse.
 Contact,  Feb. ; Mary Benson, South Africa: the struggle for a birthright
(Harmondsworth, ), p. ; TNA, PREM /, circular signed by Nokwe and Nzo.
 TNA, PREM /, Maud to Macmillan,  Feb. .
 Hunt, On the spot, pp. –; cf. ‘Letter from DWS Hunt (CRO) to Sir A Clutterbuck’, in
Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government, p. .  Star,  Feb. .
 P. Worsthorne, Tricks of memory: an autobiography (London, ), p. . Worsthorne –
life-long conservative and empire sympathizer – was appalled at the professional irresponsi-
bility of his colleagues for failing to engage with Afrikaner journalists. He was left with ‘egg on
my face’ as the only foreign reporter to have underplayed the sensational character of the
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The day following the speech, the Cape Times’s headline led on a more earth-
shattering event: the Coalbrook mining disaster where a massive rockfall had
left over  miners entombed. Die Burger, the Cape’s leading Afrikaans
newspaper, observed coolly that it was ‘good’ that Macmillan had explained
Britain’s policy on Africa because this allowed South Africa to appreciate where
it stood. Britain, it continued, was conceding to black nationalism out of a fear
that black Africa would be lost to the Western camp. Britain had to do its duty as
it saw it, but this was equally true for South Africa, whose white nation would not
‘abdicate’ in order to make it easier for the West to win its struggle. A second
editorial comment, titled ‘Thank you, Mr Macmillan’, opined that South Africa
owed the British prime minister unqualiﬁed thanks on account of his clear
opposition to trade boycotts. The right-wing newspaper Die Transvaler, which
owed more loyalty to Verwoerd (he had previously served as its editor) than Die
Burger, sounded a philosophical note which British ofﬁcials in Cape Town
admitted betrayed little ‘air of crisis’. In the view of Die Transvaler, it was
understandable that Macmillan ‘would look at Africa in a different way from
someone to whom Africa is a fatherland’. The underlying message, that South
Africa was a sovereign country with its own interests to defend, was emphatically
clear. This message was reiterated the following week when Die Transvaler ran a
lengthy interview with Eric Louw, who attacked Macmillan for criticizing the
country’s domestic policy while present as a guest. Louw wondered acidly
whether Macmillan assumed this right because of Britain’s position in the
commonwealth.
Like the Cape Times, Die Burger’s front page of  February was dominated by
the mining tragedy. A small article on the right headed ‘British Labour exults at
Macmillan’s address’ was the only front page reference. Die Burger noted
sarcastically that the speech had been greeted in Britain as a ‘great political
sensation’, an unprecedented rebuke, and a powerful repudiation of South
Africa’s race policies. But domestic reaction was more sober as it came to terms
with the sombre implications for the white man in Africa. Extensive coverage
speech. In a personal interview with a ‘serene’ Verwoerd the day after the speech, he was
advised to inform Macmillan that the wind of change was blowing through Britain rather than
Africa.  Cape Times,  Feb. .
 Die Burger,  Feb. . Neither Piet Cillé, editor of Die Burger, nor Schalk Pienaar, its
parliamentary correspondent, were favourably disposed to Verwoerd and both showed a
considerable measure of journalistic independence. The political events of  increased
their doubts about the direction of Verwoerdian apartheid. See e.g. Alex Mouton, Voorlooper: die
lewe van Schalk Pienaar (Cape Town, ), pp. –, –.
 TNA, PREM /, conﬁdential telegram , ‘Reactions to prime minister’s visit’,
 Feb. . The interpretation was that Die Transvaler might have been instructed by
Verwoerd to remain non-committal until he had more time to gauge reaction to Macmillan’s
speech, whereas Die Burger was taking the lead in ‘kite ﬂying’.
 Die Transvaler,  Feb.  (editorial); Cape Times,  Feb. .
 Die Burger,  Feb. ; ‘Letter from DWS Hunt (CRO) to Sir A. Clutterbuck’,  Feb.
, in Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government, pp. –.
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of the speeches was relegated to Die Burger’s inside pages. Here the addresses of
Macmillan and Verwoerd were printed alongside one another, suggesting parity
between the two premiers. The British prime minister’s speech was headed
‘Mr Macmillan disapproves of foreign boycott’ while Verwoerd’s response bore
the strapline ‘South Africa and its friends strive for the same objects in Africa’,
namely to secure the African continent for the West.
A more deﬁant tone was struck in Die Burger’s editorial the following day. Now
it was argued that self-interest and fear of communism were leading to frantic
abdication in Africa. The white man in Africa, including Algeria and Rhodesia,
was friendless. South Africa’s duty was to remain a bastion of civilization in a
continent where large parts were in the process of being surrendered to
backward black control and chaos. Yet, the predominant nationalist reaction
was rueful rather than outraged: we now know where we stand; you are
capitulating to the British Labour party; we are being sacriﬁced for reasons of
your pragmatism; at least Britain is not supporting the boycott. Underlying the
Afrikaner nationalist response was a determination to demonstrate that South
Africa was an independent country whose course of action would not be
changed by the opinions or actions of foreigners. Rather than panic, muted
anger and disdain for British hypocrisy were evident.
Having delivered his speech, Macmillan spent the afternoon touring the
Stellenbosch and Boland winelands, pufﬁng his pipe, apparently in relaxed
fashion. His hosts, Cabinet Minister Paul Sauer and his wife, found their
company hard-going. There was a further meeting with Verwoerd and Louw
in the evening. On  February, Macmillan was accompanied to the Cape Town
docks by Verwoerd. He sported a Boer War-style slouch hat presented to him
by Piet Beukes, editor of the United party-supporting Afrikaans newspaper,
Die Landstem. A band played ‘Auld lang syne’. As the Capetown Castle left port,
cheering well-wishers shouted ‘God save the Queen’ and ‘Long Live the
Commonwealth’.
V
Several accounts suggest that the South African public did not fully appreciate
the enormity of Macmillan’s message and that it was only when overseas
reactions were reported that its full signiﬁcance began to be appreciated. The
speech was indeed widely reported internationally, including in the United
States, France, and the Soviet bloc – which ‘unjammed’ airwaves for the ﬁrst
time since  to report the address. Yet, the view that South Africans did
 Die Burger,  Feb. . Similarly, Die Transvaler,  Feb. , reported the two speeches
alongside one another in the inside pages.
 Die Burger (editorial),  Feb..
 Conversation between Sauer and Macmillan was strained. Mrs Sauer was irritated by
Mrs Macmillan for waving at coloured pedestrians as their car sped by.
 Illustrated London News,  Feb. .  Star,  Feb. .
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not comprehend the enormity of Macmillan’s speech is simplistic and verges on
condescension.
Like other colonized peoples, South Africans of all political persuasions knew
at least as much about Britain as the British public knew about them,
probably more. South African press commentary bears this out. Die Burger
certainly had a keen appreciation of Britain’s weakened status as a colonial
power and was quick to point out the political considerations that it believed lay
behind Macmillan’s lofty prose. The editor of the Cape Argus was bemused as to
why Macmillan had come to South Africa to make this speech: impressive as it
was, it would have no effect whatsoever on nationalist opinion and the prime
minister might just as well have delivered it in his own constituency. The main
surprise, as far as the Argus was concerned, was to see ‘modern conservatism’ in
action: ‘There was nothing of the Colonel Blimp or of the imperialist to be seen
anywhere nor any boast or pride of dominion.’ In the days after his speech,
Die Transvaler gave vent to barbed cartoons and comments about Macmillan
which harped on the theme of Britain’s decline as a colonial power, while
castigating it for abandoning whites in Africa. An editorial published the day
after the Sharpeville massacre maintained that the British prime minister was
joining a list of illustrious imperial statesmen who had lost their reputations in
South Africa.
Macmillan’s personal diary is revealing of his own priorities in making the
‘wind of change’ speech: ‘I had to comfort those of British descent; inspire
the Liberals; satisfy Home Opinion; and yet keep on good terms – at least
outwardly – with the strange caucus of Afrikaner politicians who now control
this vast country.’ To his credit, Macmillan did not subsequently see his
speech as having been prophetic (as regards Sharpeville) but nor did he learn
very much about Africans or Afrikaners from his tour. His views reﬂected an
orthodox liberal-conservative outlook on South Africa which counterposed the
dynamism and enterprise of anglophone commerce and industry to the insular
bigotry of rural Afrikaners, whose minds were ﬁlled with misguided Calvinist
convictions (though he seldom missed an opportunity to praise the old-world
courtesy and hospitality which he experienced). Macmillan’s view of Verwoerd
as a man driven by religious fanaticism (‘Apartheid to him was more than a
political philosophy, it was a religion; a religion based on the Old Testament
rather than on the New’) misses the more important (and still under-
estimated) reality that Verwoerd was a radical modernizer with a totalizing
vision of the future that owed little to Afrikaner tradition. Although brought up
in a religious environment, apartheid’s principal engineer was inﬂuenced more
 Cape Argus,  Feb. .  Die Transvaler,  Mar. .
 H. Macmillan, The Macmillan diaries: premiership, –, II: Prime minister and after,
–, ed. P. Catterall (Basingstoke, ),  Feb. , p. .
 Macmillan, Pointing the way, p. .
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by his training as an academic sociologist than he was by neo-Calvinist
theology.
Macmillan’s approach to Afrikaners closely mirrored Evelyn Baring’s
‘atmosphere’ setting sketch of South Africa (prepared early on in the process
of drafting the ‘wind of change’ speech), which linked the ‘laager mentality’
mindset of contemporary Afrikaner nationalists to that of the indomitable Boer
War leader, Paul Kruger. The ‘wind of change’ speech was also signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by John Maud, whose own views had been profoundly shaped by his
experience of the country as a Rhodes Trust fellow in  when he undertook
a major study of Johannesburg’s system of local government. (Maud’s notable
 monograph on Johannesburg shows high regard for the contribution to
its municipal life made by Milner Kindergarten members like Lionel Curtis,
Richard Feetham, John Dove, and Lionel Hitchins). Indeed, Maud’s general
outlook might have been taken directly from the pages of the interwar Round
Table and the writings of liberal historians like C. W. de Kiewiet or Eric Walker.
Maud’s ﬁnal ambassadorial dispatch from South Africa in  is a case in point
as he dwelt on the Calvinist inﬂuences on Afrikaner nationalism and remarked
in sniffy tones that Verwoerd’s views ‘owe more to the th than to the th
century – though there is an ominous Hitlerian smell about it’.
As much as to Verwoerd, perhaps even more, Macmillan’s message was
addressed to settler opinion in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia and, crucially,
their supporters on the Tory benches at home. One of the truisms of major
speeches made in foreign countries is that their primary target is the speaker’s
domestic audience. In Britain, the speech was immediately recognized
as signalling a clear break with vestigial empire loyalism, a willingness to
countenance more rapid withdrawal from Africa, and a readiness to abandon
support of South Africa at the United Nations. This was probably the most
effective message of the speech. An article titled ‘Mr Macmillan dispels the
apartheid taboo’ by the London Times’s political correspondent referred to
Macmillan’s incisive contribution as an issue that had been hedged about with
inhibitions and falsity for too long within British government circles. A fresh
wind of change was at last blowing through the corridors of Whitehall and
the Commons. As for conservative reactionaries, there was no sign of any Tory
back-bench revolt, nor was there any individual within the Tory party able to
 R. B. Miller, ‘Science and society in the early career of H. F. Verwoerd’, Journal of Southern
African Studies,  (), pp. –. The account given by Verwoerd’s son, Wilhelm, of his
father’s religious persona, is ambiguous. See W. J. Verwoerd, ed., Verwoerd só Onthou Ons Hom
(Pretoria, ), pp. –.
 TNA, PREM /, Home to Macmillan,  Dec. , containing Baring’s views.
 J. P. R. Maud, City government: the Johannesburg experiment (Oxford, ), p. . This
wide-ranging – but not much used – text is a landmark local history. Maud tutored on the
Oxford Colonial Administrative Services course from  to .
 Extracts from Maud’s valedictory dispatch to Lord Home as high commissioner and
ambassador in Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government, doc. , ‘Review of the
problems of South Africa and British policy’,  May , p. .
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challenge Macmillan’s record as ‘a practical man of affairs’. The right-wing
conservatives who formed the Monday Club in direct opposition to Macmillan’s
address now occupied a fringe position in the Conservative party.
The effect of the ‘wind of change’ speech in South Africa, already
overshadowed by the Coalbrook mining tragedy, was soon occluded by another
disaster at nearby Sharpeville. In Afrikaner nationalist mythology, Verwoerd’s
response to Macmillan, his steadfast refusal to panic after the Sharpeville
shootings, and his extraordinary recovery from an assassination attempt in
April, all contributed to his growing reputation as a man of indomitable power
who had been ‘preserved by Providence to lead South Africa to safety’. It is
worth remembering that, prior to Macmillan’s visit, Verwoerd’s hold on his
cabinet was by no means entirely secure. Indeed, some in the opposition
believed that Verwoerd’s decision to hold a referendum on the republic was an
attempt to deﬂect attention from ructions within the National party over his
unyielding implementation of apartheid. By the end of that most eventful year
Verwoerd exerted a mesmerizing hold on the Nationalist caucus – and large
swathes of the electorate – which now made his position unassailable.
V I
South Africa’s exit from the commonwealth in  consolidated Verwoerd’s
reputation as a ‘man of granite’. In calling for the republican referendum in
January , the prime minister had taken a calculated risk: he could not be
certain of winning the vote. Although Verwoerd had long regarded republican
status for South Africa as a prime political objective, he was by no means sure
whether this necessitated actual leaving of the commonwealth. Macmillan
demurred when asked about this in private conversations in Cape Town.
Verwoerd argued that republican status, far from threatening relations between
English- and Afrikaans-speakers, would in fact help to draw whites together and
thereby entrench white supremacy. His decision to announce a referendum on
the eve of Macmillan’s visit was probably inﬂuenced by his calculation that the
British premier’s presence in South Africa might help to swing English-speakers
in favour of a republic. ‘Nation-building’ was therefore a leading theme in the
Nationalists’ referendum campaign and the date chosen for the inauguration of
the republic –  May – was the anniversary of the  Treaty of Vereeniging
which brought the South African War to a conclusion. In his assessment of
white English-speaking South Africans’ willingness to grant the government
 Times,  Feb. .
 ‘South Africa: from Sharpeville to the Congo’, Round Table,  (), pp. –, at
p. .
 Kenney, Verwoerd, p. ; A. N. Pelzer, ed., Verwoerd speaks: speeches, –
(Johannesburg, ), pp. xx–xxi; ‘South Africa: from Sharpeville to the Congo’, p. .
 See e.g. Eisenberg, ‘The Commonwealth Conference’, p. ; Guardian,  Jan. .
 Cape Argus,  Nov.  (editorial),  Jan.  (editorial).
MACM I L L A N , V E RWO E R D , ‘W I N D O F CH A N G E . ’
tacit if not active support, Verwoerd was vindicated: events such as the ‘wind of
change’ speech, Sharpeville, and the implosion of the Congo brought whites
together as never before and considerably strengthened his hand in domestic
politics. In the general election of  the government increased its
parliamentary majority as well as its overall share of the vote, gaining votes
from Afrikaner moderates and English-speakers alike.
Verwoerd was also proved correct in his view that South Africa’s links with
Britain would not be materially affected one way or another by commonwealth
membership. As Lord Home made clear in a minute to Macmillan in
December , relations with South Africa might be a political liability, yet this
was offset by crucial economic and strategic interests. The continuing supply
of uranium from South Africa was an important case in point. Britain’s
responsibility for the High Commission Territories depended on maintaining
friendly relations with South Africa. The  Simonstown agreement, which
allowed the British navy continued access to the Cape – while reafﬁrming South
African sovereignty – proved mutually advantageous to both countries. South
Africa’s contribution to the future of the Sterling area as well as its critical
importance as source of gold to markets managed by the Bank of England (and
to the stability of exchange rates) were considerable. Moreover, South Africa
remained one of Britain’s most important export markets, amounting to
around  per cent of South African imports. The fact that this market was
diminishing was a matter of serious concern to British exporters. British capital
investments in South Africa increased steadily in the post-war era and at –
per cent of total British capital investment was comparable to British holdings
in the United States, Australia, and in Canada. Moreover, the rate of return
on British direct investments in South Africa in  was, at · per cent,
considerably above the norm. Ofﬁcial notes dealing with preparations for the
‘wind of change’ speech advised emphasis on the fact that South Africa was
Britain’s ‘third best customer and that we were easily their best customer’.
Macmillan was highly attentive to matters of trade and the balance of payments.
Before leaving for Africa he remarked on the Labour party’s plan for a boycott
of South African goods as ‘absurd’, with potentially ‘grave results on employ-
ment at home’. Immediately after Sharpeville, he comforted himself by noting
that the American State Department’s condemnation of the South African
 N.M. Stultz and J. Butler, ‘The South African general election of ’, Political Science
Quarterly,  (), pp. –.  A. Hepple, Verwoerd (Harmondsworth, ), p. .
 ‘“Policy towards South Africa: the United Nations items”: minute by Lord Home to
Mr Macmillan’,  Dec. , doc. , in Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government,
pp. –.
 G. Berridge, Economic power in Anglo-South African diplomacy: Simonstown, Sharpeville and
after (London, ), pp.  and ff, –,  and ff. For a contemporary statement of the
potential economic pitfalls for South Africa in its loss of commonwealth membership, see e.g.
‘The commonwealth: a South African view’, Round Table,  (), pp. –; TNA, PREM
/, ‘Note for the record’ by Tim Bligh,  Dec. .
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government would ‘at least not encourage S. A. to sell gold in New York rather
than in London’.
Verwoerd knew that Britain was not going to risk these binding attachments.
Historic ties and appeals to ‘kith and kin’, to which Macmillan was closely
attentive, were an important factor in retaining connections, notwithstanding
the growing calls for boycotts. International outrage at the Sharpeville massacre
considerably increased pressure on Britain to condemn South Africa. Yet,
although the Labour and Liberal parties were quick to react by raising questions
and putting motions in parliament, the government demurred. Only under
severe pressure from an outraged public and after a lengthy cabinet meeting
did the British government emerge from its ‘shell of reserve’ three days
after Sharpeville to express its ‘deep sympathy with all the people of South
Africa’ – by way of an amendment to a Labour motion deploring the
shootings.
Mindful of the need to avoid antagonizing South Africa and threatening the
future of the commonwealth, Macmillan’s cabinet advised abstaining on a 
Security Council resolution which called for action against South Africa.
Macmilllan admitted that this decision was ‘not very noble, but very sensible’.
Only in , following South Africa’s exit from the commonwealth, did Britain
endorse a UN vote declaring South Africa’s racial policies to be in ﬂagrant
violation of the Charter. Such reticence provides strong support for
Berridge’s argument that although the ‘wind of change’ speech came as
something of a shock to the South African government, the soothing passages
of his speech in which he emphasized the points of difference were outweighed
by his assurance about ‘the many practical interests which we share in
common’.
The acute discomfort experienced by Macmillan’s government in reconciling
the high moral tone of some of its pronouncements about decolonization and
multi-racialism, with its effective appeasement of South Africa, had much to do
with Macmillan’s strenuous efforts to hold the new commonwealth together.
Macmillan suffered excruciatingly in his efforts to manage differences during
the commonwealth meeting of  and, even more, in  when the issue of
South Africa’s membership came to a head. Verwoerd was not present at the
 meeting because of the attempt on his life. But he took full control of the
situation in . Without displaying the truculent bad temper that Louw had
given vent to at the  Commonwealth Conference, Verwoerd remained
 Macmillan, Macmillan diaries, II,  Jan.  and  Mar. , pp. , .
 Times,  Mar. .
 ‘Cabinet conclusions’, doc. , in Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government,
pp. –.  Macmillan, Pointing the way, p. .
 Berridge, Economic power, p. ; R. Hyam and P. Henshaw, The lion and the springbok:
Britain and South Africa since the Boer War (Cambridge, ), p. .
 Berridge, Economic power, p. .
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entirely uncompromising in the face of attempts to persuade him to make
concessions.
The upshot of the extended negotiations, which absorbed a great deal of
Macmillan’s energies and resulted in the depletion of much of the political
capital he built up during his Africa tour, was that Verwoerd decided not
to reapply for commonwealth membership in the face of South Africa’s likely
expulsion. Whether Verwoerd’s behaviour was in some sense payback for the
‘wind of change’ speech is difﬁcult to prove, but it is impossible to discount.
What is clear is that Macmillan was anxious to avoid South Africa’s expulsion,
fearing the commonwealth’s disintegration. It should be noted that Verwoerd
(who could be pragmatic as well as doctrinaire) was by no means committed to
leaving the commonwealth, preferring to leave his options open. This much was
apparent in the tetchy private deliberations between the two leaders in Cape
Town. It was largely because Verwoerd overplayed his hand and refused to
entertain any concessions at all that South Africa parted company with the
commonwealth.
Nevertheless, Verwoerd proved able to turn an effective defeat into personal
triumph. Macmillan spent the week of the Commonwealth Conference
suffering from nervous strain and appeared grief-stricken and tearful on
account of his failure to achieve a compromise or ‘ﬁnd a formula’.
By contrast, Verwoerd arrived back in Johannesburg on  March  to a
twenty-one- gun salute, a ﬂy-past of Sabre jets, and as many as , exultant,
cheering supporters, many of whom were singing the national anthem,
Die Stem. Delusional it may have been, but this deﬁant moment was a victory
unlike any other. Verwoerd spoke of South Africa’s exclusion as a ‘miracle’.
His wife, Betsie, described the achievement of the republic as the high point of
his career.
V I I
The encounter between Macmillan and Verwoerd involved a crossing of paths
by two politicians who could not have been more different. So, too, were their
subsequent trajectories. The ‘wind of change’ speech was a splendid valedictory
address for Britain in Africa; it also turned out to mark the high point
of Macmillan’s career. Within two years, the Conservatives were beset by
 Sampson, Macmillan, p. .
 ‘“Note of a discussion between the prime minister and Dr Verwoerd” in Cape Town:
minute by Macmillan’, doc. , in Hyam and Louis, eds., The Conservative government,
pp. –. See also Bellwood, South African backdrop, p. .
 A. Horne, Macmillan, –, p. ; Sampson, Macmillan, p. ; Boyce
Richardson, ‘The Commonwealth Conference’, Africa South,  (), p. .
 Cape Argus,  Mar. ; Die Transvaler,  Mar. .
 Kenney, Verwoerd, p. ; ‘South Africa departs’, Round Table,  (), pp. –, at
p. .  Sampson, Macmillan, ch. ; Thorpe, Supermac, p. .
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economic crisis and internal political turmoil. By contrast, Verwoerd was able
to beneﬁt from the much more serious set of crises that beset South Africa
throughout . From , he enjoyed supreme political power, his
government buoyed by a resurgent economy that was entering into a decade-
long boom. This was the era of Verwoerdian high apartheid.
It is probable that Macmillan regarded his Africa tour as a preparation for the
great diplomatic ventures that lay ahead – with Britain ‘at the centre of the
interlocking circles of America, the Commonwealth and Europe’ in the context
of global cold war politics. In his autobiography, Pointing the way, Macmillan’s
account of his Africa journey appears sandwiched between two exercises in
international summitry. But, although he did not think of it as such, there may
be reasons to think of his confrontation with Verwoerd as an undeclared
or inadvertent summit, if we employ David Reynolds’s broad deﬁnition of
summitry as a form of diplomacy or dialogue between states conducted at the
highest level of leadership.
It would never have occurred to the British government to have seen it as
such, for to concede as much would be to overstate Africa’s importance. But the
South African government, ﬁxated as it was on matters of sovereignty, was
certainly inclined to see the Macmillan–Verwoerd encounter as a matter of
inter-state deliberations at the most senior levels. Records of the private
discussions between Macmillan and Verwoerd reveal that substantive matters
like the continued supply of uranium, commonwealth relations, the United
Nations, the status of South West Africa, and the future of the High Commission
Territories were all extensively covered. Louw had the temerity to press his
country’s candidature for the commonwealth seat on the UN Security Council
in , and insisted on being consulted directly by the foreign secretary on all
African matters. The tone of the private discussions between Macmillan and
Verwoerd was rather more hard-edged than was the case in Ghana or Nigeria
where Macmillan naturally fell into a more avuncular – or paternalistic –mode
as he proffered advice on matters such as the workings of Westminster-style
democracy. South Africa, it should be remembered, was fully into its post-
colonial moment whereas other African states visited by Macmillan were only
achieving their statehood.
The South African government’s keen understanding of its place in the world
no longer depended on Britain’s view, though it was certainly disappointed that
it could no longer count on Britain as a diplomatic ally in the councils of the
United Nations, as Macmillan had privately warned in Cape Town. Nor was
South Africa as surprised by Britain’s change of tack – which it understood as
 Sampson, Macmillan, p. .
 D. Reynolds, Summits: six meetings that shaped the twentieth century (London, ), p. .
 TNA, CAB /, ‘Prime minister’s African tour’, pp.  and ff.
 TNA, PREM /, summary of discussions on  Feb. , between Macmillan and
Verwoerd on United Nations: ‘Prime Minister warned Union that we might not be able to
continue to support them on this [apartheid] but might have to abstain.’
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ﬁtting into a long history of hypocrisy and cynicism – as the white settler islands
to the north who now felt betrayed. Perhaps this is why Macmillan’s iconoclastic
speech outraged opinion more in loyalist white Salisbury and in parts of
Westminster than in Cape Town or Pretoria.
Verwoerd was a fantasist insofar as he thought apartheid could really be made
to work. Yet, he had a fairly astute take on South Africa’s ongoing relations with
the outside world, Britain in particular. He may have gambled wrongly on the
issue of making no concessions to the commonwealth, but he proved correct in
reasoning that self-interest would constrain British actions against South Africa.
Most white South Africans were unimpressed by windy statements of
condemnation, whether these issued from Britain or from the United Nations.
And, in the medium term, they felt themselves vindicated. The year 
marked the end of the special post-colonial afﬁnities which characterized
relations between Britain and South Africa for ﬁfty years. The loss was mourned
alike by anglophone South Africans and imperial-minded Britons who feared
the country’s growing international isolation. But it did not substantially alter
underlying structural relationships which remained intact through the Wilson
government and beyond. Faced with the ‘wind of change’, the British ship of
state did not fundamentally alter course; it merely trimmed its sails.
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